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Do Investors See through Mistakes
in Reported Earnings?
Katsiaryna Salavei Bardos, Joseph Golec, and John P. Harding∗
Abstract
This study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings, and
whether they anticipate earnings restatements. For firms that restate at least one annual
report, we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of ini-
tial earnings announcements. Investors react positively to the component of the favorable
earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated, and they attach the same valuation to it
as to the true earnings surprise. We also find that investors anticipate the subsequent down-
ward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement
announcement, so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the
restatement announcement effect. Indeed, we show that investors punish restating firms
because the stock price gains that shareholders enjoy when firms initially announce over-
stated earnings are more than reversed by the time of the restatement announcement.
I. Introduction
Recent corporate scandals involving overstated earnings have motivated sev-
eral Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules and Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 provisions aimed at boosting the integrity of financial reports (Palmrose,
Richardson, and Scholz (2004)). The premise of these rules is that investors typ-
ically do not see through the standard financial reporting to identify accounting
mistakes and earnings manipulations. But if investors use other private and public
information to validate reported earnings, several of the new rules may be costly
and unnecessary.
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Surprisingly, earlier studies spend little time examining whether investors are
fooled by erroneous financial statements. Instead, most focus on the value effects
and stock trading behavior just before and after restatement announcements.1 But
how often and for how long are investors misled? The importance of accurate and
transparent financial statements in monitoring the health of large firms is center
stage as the country assesses the causes of the 2008 financial crisis and plans
regulatory reforms to prevent future crises. For example, accounting irregularities,
such as those that went unnoticed by auditors and regulators prior to Lehman’s
demise, drew greater attention to the question of how much investors are misled
by erroneous financial information (De la Merced (2010)).
The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of investors’
ability to see through mistakes in financial statements. Our study differs from
prior literature on restatements in that it focuses on market reaction to the origi-
nal announcement of misstated earnings and the valuation of restating firms in the
error period, which extends from the 1st misstated period to the day of restatement
announcement.2 To the best of our knowledge, no prior study examines the mar-
ket reaction to initial announcements of incorrect earnings that are subsequently
restated. Only one previous study examines valuation in the error period for an
older and smaller sample of restatements (Kinney and McDaniel (1989)).
In the absence of mistakes in financial statements, abnormal returns asso-
ciated with earnings announcements are an increasing function of earnings sur-
prises. For our sample of 492 restatements, we decompose the earnings surprise
into 2 components: the true earnings surprise and the surprise due to the error.3 If
investors are misled by erroneous earnings and treat the correct and error compo-
nents the same, then any associated abnormal returns will be proportionately the
same for each component.
Indeed, for the subsample of firms that restated at least one annual report, we
find that, during the error period, investors react positively to the error component
of the earnings surprise and attach the same valuation to the error component of
the earnings surprise as to the true part of the earnings surprise. Furthermore,
our evidence suggests that investors are more misled by mistakes made at the
beginning rather than at the end of the error period.
1Several studies document negative abnormal reaction to the announcement of restatements of
about 9% around a 2-day restatement announcement period (Palmrose et al. (2004), Agrawal and
Cooper (2007), and Bardos, Golec, and Harding (2011)).
2For example, the error period of a company with a fiscal year-end on December 31 that restated
1999 and 2000 annual reports on April 10, 2001, starts on January 1, 1999, and ends on April 9, 2001.
3Mistakes in financial statements can be either intentional or unintentional. Some mistakes in fi-
nancial statements can be due to pure internal control failure or judgment error, while the management
of some firms can intentionally mislead investors. Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2003) say that “it is rea-
sonable to assume that earnings restatement firms can be characterized as firms who knowingly and
intentionally engaged in earnings manipulation.” We do not make a judgment regarding the intent
of the company that makes a mistake and do not differentiate between intentional and unintentional
mistakes in this study. Our focus is on the impact of mistakes on stock returns irrespective of the
intent. We do differentiate between firms that acknowledged fraud during the announcement of the
restatement. However, the identification of fraud is very difficult, because motivations for fraud and
aggressive accounting are the same (DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991), Dechow and Skinner (2000)).
Moreover, the acknowledgment of fraud as a reason for restatement can be due to embezzlement by
lower rank employees rather than the misdeeds of top level management.
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Firms that restate earnings downward experience negative abnormal returns
several months before they restate. This result holds for both annual and quarterly
restatements (restate only 10-Qs) and for various methods of calculating abnor-
mal returns. The magnitude of abnormal buy-and-hold returns prior to restatement
announcements is more than twice the announcement effect.4 Indeed, these neg-
ative abnormal returns more than offset the initial positive abnormal returns en-
joyed by firms when they initially report overstated earnings. Furthermore, firms
with downward quarterly restatements exhibit negative abnormal performance
after the restatement announcement. Hence, the total negative impact of a restate-
ment is much larger than the announcement effect. Overall our findings indicate
that the market punishes restating firms with a discount that is greater than the
misvaluation created by the misstated earnings.
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that firms that understate earnings and thus
subsequently restate earnings upward also experience negative abnormal returns
1 month prior to their restatement and at the restatement announcement, suggest-
ing that restatements are bad news even when firms revise earnings upward.
Securities regulators could interpret our results as supporting the view that
investors would benefit from improved financial reporting practices. Although
investors start to anticipate restatements several months prior to announcement,
they are misled at the initial announcement of erroneous earnings. The average
length of the error period is 2 years for the full sample and 2.5 years for annual
restatements, so investors trade on erroneous information for quite some time.
In addition to examining valuation in the error period, we also study returns
of restating firms during 2 other periods: i) the 3-year period prior to the 1st
restated report (pre-error period); ii) and the 3-year period after the restatement
announcement (post-restatement period). We find little evidence of abnormal per-
formance in the pre-error period and find some evidence of negative abnormal
performance in the post-restatement period for firms that restate net income down-
ward. Furthermore, we find that firms that make mistakes in core accounts, such as
revenue and cost, underperform more than other restating firms in the last quartile
of the error period, suggesting that investors penalize firms more for core account
mistakes.5 Firms that commit fraud and later restate have better performance in
the 1st quartile of the error period than nonfraud restaters, suggesting that fraud-
ulent earnings misstatements are harder to detect.
Our paper contributes to the literature that studies penalties for firms that
misreport earnings. Several papers find that the costs of equity and debt are ad-
versely affected by a restatement. Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find that restatements
increase information risk, which results in higher opportunity cost of equity capi-
tal. Similarly, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that the implied cost of equity goes
up after restatement. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) show that the cost of debt is also
adversely affected by restatement announcement. Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2009)
find that restating firms become financially constrained and are less likely to ob-
tain external financing after restatements. Wilson (2008) finds that the information
4Announcement effect calculated for a 3-day window around restatement starting on day −1
equals −11% (−10%) for annual (quarterly) downward restatements.
5Quartile of the error period is equal to 1/4 of the error period and is firm specific.
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content of earnings temporarily declines following a restatement. Moreover, re-
stating firms decrease labor and investment after restatement (Kedia and Philippon
(2009)). Finally, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) find evidence of high legal and
reputation costs for firms charged by the SEC with financial misrepresentation,
many of which restate financial statements.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II contains a restatement
time line, research questions, and statistical methods. Section III describes the
data. Section IV reports test results and their implications. Section V concludes
the paper.
II. Restatement Time Line, Research Questions,
and Methods
A. Restatement Time Line and Return Periods Defined
Several prior studies provided partial evidence regarding firm valuation in
different parts of the error period. We define the error period as the time
between the start of the 1st restated reporting period and the restatement an-
nouncement. No prior study, with the exception of Kinney and McDaniel (1989),
carefully defines the error period or analyzes returns during that time. Most pre-
vious studies use fixed time windows around the restatement or the beginning
of the error period and consequently mix returns from the pre-error, error, and
post-restatement periods.6 Kinney and McDaniel examine the error period and
find negative abnormal returns (measured for the full error period) for a limited
sample (73 quarterly restatements filed between 1976 and 1985). But they do not
break the error period into subperiods, and unlike other studies, for their limited
sample, they do not find significant negative abnormal returns at the restatement
announcement, suggesting that the sample may not be representative of more re-
cent restatements.
Figure 1 illustrates the restatement time line. We start by precisely defining
the error period (DMISTAKE0 ,DRESTATEMENT0 ). It begins at the start of the 1st re-
porting period that contains a mistake in earnings (DMISTAKE0 ) and ends on day
DRESTATEMENT0 , when management corrects earnings and reveals their true value.7
Finance theory suggests that investors value stock using expected future cash
flows; however, investors often rely on reported earnings to help them estimate
6Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 2 years prior to,
and 1 year after, restatement announcements. Badertscher, Collins, and Lys (2007) show CARs for
240 trading days before and 820 trading days after the beginning of the 1st restated period. Frieder
and Shanthikumar (2007) show CARs for the period of 252 trading days before and after restatement
and calculate various measures of abnormal returns for the month before restatement.
7We start the error period at the beginning of the 1st restated financial reporting period rather
than the announcement of earnings for this period for several reasons. First, we would lose observa-
tions because of missing earnings announcement dates in Compustat/Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (IBES). Second, management provides earnings guidance ahead of earnings announcements,
and investors’ behavior even before the announcement of incorrect earnings can reflect their ability to
see through mistakes or be fooled by them, especially if competing firms announce their earnings
before the subject firm. Moreover, the reader can visually “move” point DMISTAKE0 on all graphs
by 120 days/4 months so that DMISTAKE0 corresponds to the approximate point of the announcement
of the 1st misstated quarter.
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FIGURE 1
Restatement Time Line
In Figure 1, the restatement time line is presented.
expected cash flows. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) document that the
majority of firms view earnings as the key metric for an external audience, more
so than cash flows. Earnings are also used as part of price earnings ratios, a widely
used valuation method of stock analysts (see Block (1999)). Therefore, reporting
erroneous earnings could lead investors to over- or undervalue stocks.
B. Short-Term Market Reaction to the Announcement
of Misstated Earnings8
Investors do not rely solely on reported earnings; they estimate firms’ earnings
and future prospects using other information sources. Industry and government
statistics, competitors’ earnings announcements, and suppliers’ and customers’
information all help investors make accurate estimates of earnings prior to finan-
cial statement releases. Although investors are unlikely to completely ignore
firms’ misstated earnings, earnings that diverge significantly from those implied
by other information sources could be partially discounted by investors.
Beaver (1968), Landsman and Maydew (2002), Ball and Kothari (1991),
Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988), and Cohen, Dey, Lys, and Sunder (2007)
have established that news announcements revealed to investors prior to finan-
cial reports do not fully preempt them. But the degree to which investors rely on
reported earnings is still an open issue.
To determine how much investors are initially misled by misstated earnings,
we first examine short-term market reaction to the initial announcement of in-
correct earnings. Starting with Ball and Brown (1968), prior literature has shown
that earnings announcement returns are a positive function of how much earnings
deviate from expectations.9 The standard test of the relation is
Rt = α + b1(It − Et−1(It)) + εt = α + b1SUEt + εt,(1)
where Rt is the abnormal return at the earnings announcement at time t, It is the
firm’s correctly stated net income at time t, and Et−1(It) is the market’s expecta-
tion of net income just prior to the earnings announcement. Here, It − Et−1(It)
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we analyze short-term reaction to the initial
announcement of misstated earnings.
9See also Collins and Kothari (1989), Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), among others.
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is called the unexpected earnings. Both earnings and expected earnings are mea-
sured on a per share basis and are standardized by dividing by the stock price; the
result is called the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). The coefficient b1 is
called the earnings response coefficient.
If investors are misled by earnings mistakes, overstatements (understate-
ments) should lead to larger (smaller) abnormal announcement returns than equa-
tion (1) predicts. We study this relation with
Rt = α + b1(It − Et−1(It)) + b2Mt + εt(2)
= α + b1SUEt + b2MISTAKEt + εt,
where Mt (MISTAKE) is the amount by which earnings are misstated.10 If
investors see through the error, then b2 should equal 0. If investors are misled
by the reporting error, then b2 should be positive. If b2 equals b1, then investors
are completely fooled and treat the misstated component of earnings the same
way that they treat the correctly stated component. If b2 > 0 and b2 < b1, then
investors are only partly fooled.
We estimate equation (2) for our sample of restating firms and for control
firms matched to restating firms based on size, book-to-market, and industry
(3-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code). Since
the focus of most of our analysis is the error period, the match is performed just
before the error period in year m − 1, where m is the fiscal year of a firm’s 1st
mistake.11 First, for each firm we limit potential control firms to those with the
same 3-digit NAICS code.12 Next, we find the closest firm in size and book-
to-market using the method proposed by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), which
is widely used in the literature, first identifying all potential control firms with
size between 70% and 130% of that of the restating firm, and then choosing the
one with the book-to-market value closest to that of the restating firm.13 Size is
measured by the market value of equity at m − 1. Book-to-market ratio is cal-
culated as the ratio of book equity to market equity at m − 1. We eliminate all
restating firms from the pool of potential control firms. We also require con-
trol firms to have Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) returns for at
10For notational simplicity, in equation (2) and subsequent related equations, we do not explicitly
show the standardization adjustment. In all cases, earnings (It), expected earnings Et−1[It], and the
mistake Mt , are per share numbers standardized by dividing by the stock price at t.
11The matching is based on fiscal, not calendar year. For example, if a firm’s fiscal year ends on
March 31 and it made the 1st mistake in the year ending March 31, 1999, then the size and book-to-
market for period m − 1 correspond to the year of March 31, 1998 (in Compustat, fiscal year 1997).
The matching firm is then found based on size and book-to-market ratios calculated for 1997 fiscal
year irrespective of the month of the fiscal year-end for the matching firm.
12A number of studies suggest the importance of matching on industry (Kahle and Walkling (1996),
Barber and Lyon (1997)). Matching on industry is particularly important for this study because ac-
counting rules vary by industry, and our sample includes financials and utilities.
13For 30 restating firms, there were no controls that satisfied data requirements. For these firms,
we chose a control firm that is the closest in size within 3-digit NAICS code. The difference in size
of control firms for this group and restating firms ranges between 32% and 158% of the size of the
restating firms, with a mean of 59% and a median of 54%. For 2 restating firms, control firms were
found as the closest in size within 2-digit NAICS code.
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least as many trading days as the corresponding restating firm 1 year prior to the
matched restating firm’s mistake date and 1 year subsequent to the restatement
date.
For restating firms, we hand collected originally reported and restated earn-
ings from restatement announcements and SEC filings for every earnings an-
nouncement that occurred during the error period.14 For control firms, we use
earnings data from IBES. To make right-hand-side variables comparable across
firms, we use earnings per share (EPS) numbers scaled by stock price at the end
of the quarter. We use IBES consensus analyst forecasts immediately prior to the
earnings announcement as expected earnings. Following Livnat and Mendenhall
(2006), we calculate consensus analyst forecasts as the median of forecasts re-
ported to IBES in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement, considering
only the most recent forecast for each analyst.
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) show that investors price the Street earnings
numbers reported by analyst tracking services, such as IBES, rather than the earn-
ings numbers reported under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
Street earnings exclude certain expenses, such as special items and noncash items,
from GAAP earnings. Bradshaw and Sloan show that Street earnings reported in
IBES are more directly comparable with analysts’ forecasts and therefore pro-
vide a better measure of the true earnings surprise associated with an announce-
ment. To determine actual earnings (It in equation (2)), we start with originally
reported Street earnings obtained from IBES and adjust that by the mistake to
calculate It and SUE in equation (2).15 Here, Rt is market-adjusted return for a
3-day window (−1,+1) relative to the earnings announcement on day 0. We use
the value-weighted CRSP market index as a proxy for the market return.16 Earn-
ings announcement dates are from IBES. We cluster standard errors by industry
(3-digit NAICS code) to account for correlation of observations for firms in the
same industry.17
14For example, a firm that restated 2 years will have 8 quarterly earnings announcements during its
error period (if all data are available).
15We subtract the amount of the mistake in GAAP EPS from IBES earnings to obtain restated
Street earnings. Such calculation assumes that a mistake was made in accounts that are not sub-
tracted from GAAP earnings when calculating Street earnings. To check the robustness of results
reported in the paper, we perform 3 additional tests. First, whenever GAAP earnings do not equal
Street earnings, we eliminate observations for which restatement affected noncore accounts. Thus,
we delete observations for which the mistake could have occurred in one of the accounts that is de-
ducted to get to Street earnings. This results in a sample of 357 observations for restating firms (68%
of 553 observations with available data for estimating equation (2)). Second, whenever GAAP earn-
ings do not equal Street earnings and the restatement did not affect core accounts, we set the mistake
equal to 0 instead of deleting these observations. Third, we restrict the sample to firms for which
GAAP and Street earnings are the same (55% of 553 restating firm observations with available data
for estimating equation (2)). All approaches yield coefficients of the same sign and similar magni-
tude and significance. Inference regarding the difference between the coefficient estimates is also the
same.
16Our results are very similar using the equal-weighted index and market model-adjusted returns.
For market model-adjusted returns we use standard event study methodology and estimate the
market model for a 1-year period starting on day −46 relative to earnings announcement using CRSP
market index. We reported results using market-adjusted returns because we lose fewer observations
when calculating returns this way.
17Our results are robust to clustering standard errors by restatement.
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C. Long-Run Valuation of Restating Firms
If investors are misled by erroneous financial statements, they could mis-
value stocks for as long as the misinformation persists during the error period.
We examine abnormal returns measured over different parts of the error period
to shed light on this issue. Misvaluation is measured in 2 ways: CARs defined
relative to the overall market, and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) de-
fined relative to a sample of control firms matched by size, book-to-market, and
industry.
If mistakes in financial reporting allow restating firms to exceed (meet) in-
vestor’s expectations and investors do not see through the financial reports, abnor-
mal returns in the error period should be positive (0). Negative abnormal returns
in the error period for a firm that is reporting that it exceeded investor expecta-
tions (when actual results were less than expected) would suggest that investors
see through overstated earnings. Because investors’ perceptions of true earnings
and the associated abnormal returns could change during the error period, we split
the error period into quartiles (where each quartile represents 1/4 of the error period
and is firm specific).
Our analysis of the ability of the market, and hence the marginal investor,
to anticipate restatements is related to prior literature that studied the trading be-
havior of sophisticated investors preceding restatements. For example, Efendi,
Kinney, and Swanson (2004) and Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman
(2006) show that short interest increases prior to restatements and declines there-
after, and the larger the short interest, the larger the short-term stock price
decline at the restatement announcement. These studies examine fixed time inter-
vals prior to the restatement date instead of defining the precise error periods for
each firm. They do not show whether short seller trading causes negative returns,
or if negative returns cause short sellers to sell shares of restating firms. Agrawal
and Cooper (2007) show that insiders sell more shares before restatements, and
Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang (2005) and Frieder and Shanthikumar (2007) find that
large and institutional investors decrease their stock holdings before restatement
announcements. Griffin (2003) finds that insiders and short sellers predict cor-
rective disclosures (including restatements) that led to class action lawsuits.18
These studies’ results are consistent with the notion that sophisticated investors
anticipate restatements.
All of these studies used the Government Accountability Office (formerly
General Accounting Office (GAO) (2002)) sample of restatements. The GAO
sample includes many restatements due to changes in accounting standards (e.g.,
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 101, FASB 142, and others) that
do not necessarily represent an accounting error and can be more easily antic-
ipated. We reviewed all restatements and deleted restatements that were caused
by a change in accounting standards and did not correct an accounting error.
18Securities class action lawsuits filed under Rule 10b-5 allege material flaws pertaining to firms’
disclosure. Allegedly, firms’ misstatements cause inflation in the stock price during the class action
period. Most of these lawsuits are filed on behalf of shareholders who bought the stock during the
period of inflated stock prices and are entitled to compensation.
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III. Data
Restatement dates and restatement characteristics were hand collected from
the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases
were researched using key words “restatement,” “restat,” “revis,” “adjust,”
“error,” and “responding to guidance from the SEC” for the period January 1,
1997–June 30, 2002. We selected this period for 2 reasons. First, the GAO (2002)
made a sample of restatements announced in this period publicly available. Sec-
ond, all restatements precede the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, all restatements
in our sample were made in the same regulatory environment. We cross-checked
our sample with the GAO sample and added all restatements in the GAO sample
that were not identified by the Lexis-Nexis search. Panels A and B of Table 1
compare our sample to that of the GAO and present the reasons for deleting
GAO restatements. Overall, we deleted 431 restatements out of the total of 918
restatements in the GAO sample. We excluded restatements that were caused
by an adoption of new accounting rules or a change in method of accounting
(130 restatements), and retained only restatements due to a mistake (including
fraud) or an improper interpretation of GAAP. We also deleted restatements that
affected only the timing of item recognition and had no impact on annual net
income (44 restatements). In addition, we deleted restatements if we were unable
to obtain the necessary firm data from CRSP and Compustat (187 restatements).
This procedure resulted in 492 restatements made by 465 firms (Panel C of
Table 1). Most of the firms (95%) restate their financial reports only once in the
sample period. After identifying the sample of companies announcing restate-
ments, we collected additional data on the restatements from the firms’ amended
SEC reports (Forms 10-K/A(s) and 10-Q/A(s)), including: date of the restatement
announcement, years and quarters restated, and original and restated net income
in each period. Because the reporting of restatements is very heterogeneous, we
had to consult multiple sources to find all necessary information. Some firms re-
ported the impact of a restatement on earnings in the restatement announcement,
while some reported the impact in a footnote in their 10-Ks filed subsequent to
their restatement announcement dates. Some firms filed amended 10-Qs for all
restated periods, while others restated net income and EPS in 10-Qs filed after the
restated period. The originally reported numbers were collected from originally
filed 10-Qs. Collecting this data required reviewing each restating firm’s financial
reports filed both before and after the restatement announcement.
Panels A and B of Table 2 report sample characteristics for the fiscal year-
end preceding the year or quarter of the 1st mistake (m − 1) and for the 1st year
after the restatement announcement (r + 1). In the year preceding a mistake, our
average firm has a mean market value of $2.03 billion, a mean book value of
assets of $1.92 billion, a mean book-to-market ratio of 0.52, and a mean ratio
of long-term debt to total assets of 18%. Comparison of data in Panels A and B
suggests that market value decreases subsequent to restatement, while leverage
remains unchanged.
Table 2 also reports statistics for the year prior to restatement (Panel C).
The problem with this year is that it belongs to the pre-error period for firms
restating less than 1 year and to the error period for firms restating more than
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TABLE 1
Sample Description
Restatement dates and characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The Lexis-Nexis
and Factiva databases were researched using key words “restatement,” “restat,” “revis,” “adjust,” “error,” and “responding
to guidance from the SEC” during the period January 1, 1997–June 30, 2002.We cross-checked our sample with the sample
released by the GAO (2002). Unlike the GAO sample, we exclude restatements that were caused by the adoption of new
accounting rules, and retain only restatements due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules.
Panel A. Sample Selection
Source Number of Restatements
GAO sample 918
Less deleted restatements 431
Plus additional restatements 5
Total sample 492
Panel B. Reasons for Deleting GAO Restatements
Reason for Deleting Number of Restatements
Data not available on either CRSP or Compustat 187
New rule adoption 114
In the sample period, companies adopted the following rules: FASB 101, FASB 133,
EIC-113, EITF 00-10, EITF 00-14, FASB 142, etc. Approximately 50% of new rule adop-
tion restatements are due to adoption of FASB 101 revenue recognition rule.
Change in method of accounting 16
No restatement was made despite the announcement of a possibility of a restatement 20
No information found regarding restatement 25
Restatement due to timing 44
Other 25
Sixteen of the restatement announcements in the GAO sample were not announce-
ments of new restatements, but rather releases of new information regarding already
announced restatements. This category also includes restatements that were not a re-
sult of a mistake or a misinterpretation of accounting rules (e.g., restatements due to
changes in the number of shares).
Total number of deleted restatements 431
Panel C. Number of Restatements and Restating Firms
Number of Restatements by the Same Number of
Firm in the Sample Period Restating Firms Number of Restatements
1 441 441
2 21 42
3 3 9
Total 465 492
Panel D. Restatements by Year
Year Number of Restatements
1997 63
1998 64
1999 111
2000 109
2001 76
2002 (through June 30, 2002) 69
Total 492
1 year. However, many prior studies analyzing restating firms report descriptive
statistics for this year. We include Panel C to make our sample comparable to
prior studies.19 All of the rest of our analysis carefully separates pre-error, error,
and post-restatement periods.
19Panel C of Table 2 shows that the mean book value of assets as reported at the fiscal year-end
prior to the restatement announcement (r − 1) is $2.60 billion, compared to $1.14 billion for the
sample of 403 restatements made between 1995 and 1999, analyzed by Palmrose et al. (2004). The
mean (median) ratio of long-term debt to total assets is 19% (14%) for our sample, compared to 21%
(6%) for Palmrose et al.
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TABLE 2
Characteristics of Restating Firms at Different Points in Time
Relative to Mistakes and Restatements
Market value is the market value of equity calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. Book-
to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value divided by the market value of common equity. Leverage is the
value of long-term debt divided by total assets. Core is a dummy variable that equals 1 if revenue or expense accounts
were restated. Fraud is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company announced fraud as a reason for restatement. In
Panel B, we excluded 2 outliers with book-to-market equal to –436 and –292 when reporting statistics for book-to-market.
Panel A. Year –1 Relative to Mistake
Standard Lower Upper
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Deviation Quartile Median Quartile N
Market value (mil) $2,032 $131,717 $4 $10,012 $46 $173 $738 442
Total assets (mil) $1,916 $105,130 $1 $8,427 $37 $141 $764 469
Book-to-market 0.52 4.42 –2.11 0.55 0.21 0.40 0.71 441
Leverage 0.18 1.66 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.12 0.28 466
Panel B. Year +1 Relative to Restatement
Standard Lower Upper
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Deviation Quartile Median Quartile N
Market value (mil) $2,064 $115,268 $1 $9,595 $24 $95 $435 401
Total assets (mil) $2,452 $93,170 $3 $8,872 $50 $201 $1,148 406
Book-to-market 0.30 9.47 –64.66 4.84 0.24 0.54 1.09 399
Leverage 0.18 2.85 0.00 0.24 0.01 0.11 0.29 404
Panel C. Year –1 Relative to Restatement
Standard Lower Upper
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Deviation Quartile Median Quartile N
Market value (mil) $2,210 $112,194 $2 $9,201 $44 $179 $681 462
Total assets (mil) $2,600 $112,839 $2 $10,142 $55 $223 $1,093 466
Book-to-market 0.65 14.64 –2.90 0.97 0.19 0.46 0.85 461
Leverage 0.19 1.66 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.14 0.29 464
Panel D. Exchange Listing
Exchange Number of Firms As a %
NYSE 146 29.67%
NASDAQ 315 64.02%
AMEX 31 6.30%
Panel E. Restatement Characteristics
Variable Yes As a % No As a %
Fraud 57 11.59% 435 88.41%
Core 272 50.75% 264 49.25%
The majority of restating firms are listed on the NASDAQ (64.0%), with
29.7% listed on the NYSE (Panel D of Table 2). In 12% of our observations,
the firm announced that the restatement was due to fraud (Panel E of Table 2).
Our definition of fraudulent behavior is conservative because it is based solely on
self-reported fraud and potentially omits instances of fraud that are only revealed
by subsequent investigations. Approximately 1/2 of the restatements impact core
accounts, such as revenue and expense (Panel E of Table 2).
Table 3 presents the distribution of restatements by industry (3-digit
NAICS code). The following 5 industries account for 40% of all restatements
in our sample period: i) computer and electronic product manufacturing;
ii) publishing industries (except Internet); iii) credit intermediation and related
activities; iv) professional, scientific, and technical services; and v) machinery
manufacturing.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the length of the error period and the
number of years restated. The number of years restated is the number of years in
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TABLE 3
Distribution of Restatements by Industry (N = 492)
In Table 3 the distribution of restatements are presented by industry.
NAICS Number of
Code Code Description Restatements %
334 Computer and electronic product manufacturing 66 13.4%
511 Publishing industries (except Internet) 49 10.0%
522 Credit intermediation and related activities 35 7.1%
541 Professional, scientiﬁc, and technical services 27 5.5%
333 Machinery manufacturing 16 3.3%
336 Transportation equipment manufacturing 15 3.0%
325 Chemical manufacturing 14 2.8%
524 Insurance carriers and related activities 14 2.8%
339 Miscellaneous manufacturing 13 2.6%
561 Administrative and support services 12 2.4%
518 Data processing, hosting, and related services 11 2.2%
311 Food manufacturing 9 1.8%
423 Merchant wholesalers, durable goods 9 1.8%
221 Utilities 8 1.6%
513 Broadcasting and telecommunications 8 1.6%
512 Motion picture and sound recording industries 7 1.4%
517 Telecommunications 7 1.4%
562 Waste management and remediation services 7 1.4%
315 Apparel manufacturing 6 1.2%
331 Primary metal manufacturing 6 1.2%
446 Health and personal care stores 6 1.2%
514 Information services and data processing services 6 1.2%
523 Securities, commodity contracts, and other ﬁnancial investments 6 1.2%
525 Funds, trusts, and other ﬁnancial vehicles 6 1.2%
623 Nursing and residential care facilities 6 1.2%
211 Oil and gas extraction 5 1.0%
326 Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 5 1.0%
421 Wholesale trade, durable goods 5 1.0%
424 Merchant wholesalers, nondurable goods 5 1.0%
448 Clothing and clothing accessories stores 5 1.0%
322 Paper manufacturing 4 0.8%
332 Fabricated metal product manufacturing 4 0.8%
337 Furniture and related product manufacturing 4 0.8%
422 Wholesale trade, nondurable goods 4 0.8%
443 Electronics and appliance stores 4 0.8%
488 Support activities for transportation 4 0.8%
621 Ambulatory health care services 4 0.8%
713 Amusement, gambling, and recreation industries 4 0.8%
722 Food services and drinking places 4 0.8%
324 Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 3 0.6%
327 Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 3 0.6%
335 Electrical equipment, appliance, and component manufacturing 3 0.6%
445 Food and beverage stores 3 0.6%
484 Truck transportation 3 0.6%
532 Rental and leasing services 3 0.6%
611 Educational services 3 0.6%
999 Industrial conglomerates and multi-sector holdings 3 0.6%
212 Mining (except oil and gas) 2 0.4%
213 Support activities for mining 2 0.4%
236 Construction of buildings 2 0.4%
237 Heavy and civil engineering construction 2 0.4%
312 Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 2 0.4%
316 Leather and allied product manufacturing 2 0.4%
323 Printing and related support activities 2 0.4%
452 General merchandise stores 2 0.4%
721 Accommodation 2 0.4%
233 Building, developing, and general contracting 1 0.2%
235 Special trade contractors 1 0.2%
313 Textile mills 1 0.2%
314 Textile product mills 1 0.2%
441 Motor vehicle and parts dealers 1 0.2%
442 Furniture and home furnishings stores 1 0.2%
444 Building material and garden equipment and supplies dealers 1 0.2%
447 Gasoline stations 1 0.2%
451 Sporting goods, hobby, book, and music stores 1 0.2%
454 Nonstore retailers 1 0.2%
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Distribution of Restatements by Industry (N= 492)
NAICS Number of
Code Code Description Restatements %
483 Water transportation 1 0.2%
485 Transit and ground passenger transportation 1 0.2%
492 Couriers and messengers 1 0.2%
531 Real estate 1 0.2%
533 Lessors of nonﬁnancial intangible assets 1 0.2%
622 Hospitals 1 0.2%
624 Social assistance 1 0.2%
711 Performing arts, spectator sports, and related industries 1 0.2%
811 Repair and maintenance 1 0.2%
812 Personal and laundry services 1 0.2%
TABLE 4
Distribution of the Length of the Error Period and the Number of Restated Years
The Error Period is deﬁned as the period that extends from the 1st misstated period to the day of restatement announce-
ment. For example, if the company made a mistake in 1997 and announced a restatement of its 1997 annual report on
March 15, 1998, the error period would span January 1, 1997–March 15, 1998 and equal 1.20 years. The Number of
Restated Years is the number of years in which the company made a mistake. Quarterly restatements are deﬁned as re-
statements of quarterly ﬁnancial statements only and no restatement of an annual (audited) report. Annual restatements
include a restatement of at least 1 annual (audited) report. Downward (upward) restatements are deﬁned as restatements
that result in downward (upward) revision of net income.
Standard Lower Upper
Sample Mean Maximum Minimum Deviation Quartile Median Quartile N
Panel A. Error Period
Full Sample 1.89 6.83 0.27 1.21 0.94 1.62 2.62 492
Annual 2.52 6.83 1.07 1.07 1.74 2.23 3.22 315
Quarterly 0.79 1.38 0.27 0.29 0.57 0.82 1.02 177
Annual downward 2.53 6.55 1.07 1.08 1.74 2.24 3.25 242
Quarterly downward 0.79 1.38 0.27 0.29 0.57 0.82 1.03 140
Annual upward 2.52 6.83 1.22 1.06 1.82 2.21 3.11 40
Quarterly upward 0.81 1.29 0.32 0.27 0.61 0.83 1.01 20
Panel B. Number of Restated Years
Full Sample 1.40 6.00 0.25 1.06 0.50 1.00 2.00 492
Annual 1.94 6.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.75 2.75 315
Quarterly 0.45 0.75 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.50 0.75 177
Annual downward 1.96 6.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.75 2.75 242
Quarterly downward 0.45 0.75 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.50 0.75 140
Annual upward 1.93 5.50 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.75 2.38 40
Quarterly upward 0.48 0.75 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.50 0.63 20
which the company made a mistake and reported erroneous earnings. The number
of restated years is always less than or equal to the length of the error period.
Table 4 also gives statistics for the length of the error period and the number
of restated years for subsamples of quarterly and annual restatements. Quarterly
restatements are defined as restatements of quarterly financial statements only
and not restatements of an annual (audited) report. Annual restatements include
a restatement of at least one annual (audited) report. Sixty-three percent of re-
statements in our sample are annual restatements. The average number of peri-
ods restated is approximately 1/2 a year in the quarterly subsample and 2 years in
the annual subsample. The average length of the error period is 1.89 years for
the full sample, and 2.52 years and 0.79 years for annual and quarterly restate-
ments, respectively (Panel A of Table 4). The average number of years restated is
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TABLE 5
Impact of Restatement on Net Income
Panel A of Table 5 reports statistics for the difference between net income per share as restated (summed over the error
period) and net income per share as originally reported (summed over the error period) divided by stock price 360 calendar
days prior to restatement announcement. Panel B reports statistics for the difference between restated net income (summed
over the error period) and originally reported net income (summed over the error period) divided by the absolute value
of the originally reported net income (summed over the error period). Quarterly restatements are deﬁned as restatements
of quarterly ﬁnancial statements only and no restatement of an annual (audited) report. Annual restatements include a
restatement of at least 1 annual (audited) report. Downward (upward) restatements are deﬁned as restatements that result
in downward (upward) revision of net income.
Standard Lower Upper
Sample Mean Maximum Minimum Deviation Quartile Median Quartile N
Panel A. (Net Income Per Share Restated – Net Income Per Share Original) / Stock Price
Full Sample –0.03 1.85 –1.46 0.15 –0.03 –0.01 0.00 434
Annual –0.04 1.85 –1.46 0.18 –0.05 –0.01 0.00 274
Quarterly –0.02 0.25 –0.72 0.09 –0.02 –0.01 0.00 160
Downward –0.05 0.29 –1.46 0.12 –0.05 –0.01 0.00 362
Annual downward –0.06 0.29 –1.46 0.14 –0.07 –0.02 –0.01 225
Quarterly downward –0.03 0.25 –0.72 0.09 –0.03 –0.01 0.00 137
Upward 0.07 1.85 –0.55 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.06 55
Annual upward 0.08 1.85 –0.55 0.33 0.01 0.02 0.06 37
Quarterly upward 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 18
Panel B. (Net Income Restated – Net Income Original) / Absolute Value (Net Income Original)
Full Sample –2.37 6.75 –255.59 15.40 –0.79 –0.26 –0.05 449
Annual –1.32 1.76 –168.55 10.11 –0.67 –0.18 –0.04 287
Quarterly –4.22 6.75 –255.59 21.75 –1.48 –0.42 –0.06 162
Downward –2.87 –0.00 –255.59 16.65 –1.028 –0.36 –0.10 382
Annual downward –1.64 –0.00 –168.55 10.98 –0.76 –0.29 –0.08 242
Quarterly downward –5.00 –0.01 –255.59 23.31 –2.09 –0.50 –0.16 140
Upward 0.58 6.75 0.01 0.94 0.08 0.32 0.76 60
Annual upward 0.45 1.76 0.02 0.47 0.09 0.23 0.64 40
Quarterly upward 0.83 6.75 0.02 1.49 0.07 0.41 0.96 20
1.4 years for the full sample, 1.94 for annual, and 0.45 for quarterly restatements
(Panel B of Table 4). Statistics for upward and downward subsamples are similar.
Table 5 gives the impact of mistakes on net income per share scaled by stock
price (Panel A) and percent change in net income as a result of a restatement
(Panel B). If a firm restated more than 1 period, net income and net income
per share are summed over the error period. Statistics in Panel B are much more
skewed than those in Panel A. The majority of mistakes (85%) overstate net in-
come. Only 60 firms in our sample understate net income. Restatement of net
income per share is of similar magnitude for annual and quarterly restatements,
and for upward and downward restatements. However, the magnitude of the per-
cent change in net income is larger for quarterly downward restatements than for
annual downward restatements (Panel B).
IV. Results
A. Short-Term Market Reaction to the Announcement
of Misstated Earnings
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for variables used to estimate equa-
tion (2). Panels A–C show statistics for restating plus control firms for full, annual,
and quarterly samples, respectively. Panels D–F show statistics for restating firms
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TABLE 6
Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis in Table 7. SUE is the standardized unexpected
earnings relative to analyst expectations. MISTAKE is the difference between restated and originally reported earnings
and equals 0 for all control ﬁrms. Both SUE and MISTAKE are measured on a per share basis and standardized by the
stock price at the end of the quarter. Here, Rt is the market-adjusted return for a 3-day window (−1, +1) relative to the
earnings announcement on day 0. We use the value-weighted CRSP market index as a proxy for the market return, and
Rt, SUE, and MISTAKE are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
Standard Lower Upper
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Deviation Quartile Median Quartile N
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample (Restating Firms + Control Firms)
Rt –0.083% 24.986% –31.284% 9.209% –4.243% 0.220% 4.681% 1,106
SUE –0.003 0.082 –0.100 0.018 –0.003 0.000 0.001 1,106
MISTAKE 0.002 0.072 –0.052 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.001 1,106
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics: Annual Restatements (Restating Firms + Control Firms)
Rt 0.094% 24.986% –31.284% 8.576% –3.882% 0.252% 4.540% 812
SUE –0.002 0.082 –0.100 0.017 –0.002 0.000 0.001 812
MISTAKE 0.002 0.072 –0.052 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.001 812
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics: Quarterly Restatements (Restating Firms + Control Firms)
Rt –0.573% 24.986% –31.284% 10.765% –5.813% –0.150% 4.873% 294
SUE –0.004 0.082 –0.100 0.021 –0.005 0.000 0.001 294
MISTAKE 0.003 0.072 –0.052 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.003 294
Panel D. Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample (Restating Firms Only)
Rtt –0.244% 24.986% –31.284% 9.933% –5.430% 0.370% 4.971% 553
SUE –0.006 0.082 –0.100 0.024 –0.007 –0.001 0.000 553
MISTAKE 0.004 0.072 –0.052 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.005 553
Panel E. Descriptive Statistics: Annual Restatements (Restating Firms Only)
Rt 0.050% 24.986% –31.284% 8.978% –4.614% 0.624% 4.973% 406
SUE –0.004 0.082 –0.100 0.022 –0.005 –0.001 0.001 406
MISTAKE 0.003 0.072 –0.052 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.004 406
Panel F. Descriptive Statistics: Quarterly Restatements (Restating Firms Only)
Rt –1.056% 24.986% –31.284% 12.187% –7.258% –0.979% 4.971% 147
SUE –0.010 0.082 –0.100 0.027 –0.012 –0.003 0.000 147
MISTAKE 0.006 0.072 –0.052 0.017 0.000 0.003 0.009 147
only. Announcement period returns Rt are not statistically significantly different
from 0 in any of the panels. The mean earnings surprise is negative for all samples.
Interestingly, median SUE and MISTAKE are of the same magnitude but opposite
direction for all samples, suggesting that mistakes allowed the median company in
our sample to meet analyst expectations. Here, 204 restating firm quarters (37%)
corresponding to 97 firms (55%) would have fallen short of analyst expectations
had they not misstated financial statements. Both the mean and the median figures
for MISTAKE are positive in all 6 panels.20
Model 1 (full sample) in Table 7 shows estimates of equation (2) for the
combined samples of restating firms and control firms. The mistakes for con-
trol firms are assumed to be 0. Consistent with prior literature, we find that the
earnings response coefficient estimate is positive (¯b1 > 0). The estimate of the
effect of earnings mistakes (¯b2) is also positive and significant, and it is not sta-
tistically different from ¯b1. This result suggests that investors are misled by mis-
takes in financial statements at the announcement of original earnings. Investors
20MISTAKE is negative for 101 quarters.
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TABLE 7
Short-Term Market Reaction to Initial Announcement of Misstated Earnings
Models 1–3 of Table 7 estimate equation (2) for the sample of restating ﬁrms plus control ﬁrms matched on size, book-to-
market, and 3-digit NAICS code. Models 5–7 estimate equation (2) for restating ﬁrms only:
(2) Rt = a + b1SUEt + b2MISTAKEt + εt.
Model 4 estimates equation (3) for annual restatements and their control ﬁrms:
(3) Rt = a + b1SUEt + b2MISTAKEt + b3DISTANCE RESTt + b4DISTANCE RESTt × MISTAKEt + εt.
SUE is the standardized unexpected earnings relative to analyst expectations. MISTAKE is the difference between restated
and originally reported earnings and equals 0 for all control ﬁrms. Both SUE and MISTAKE are measured on a per share
basis and standardized by the stock price at the end of the quarter. Here, Rt is the market-adjusted return for a 3-day
window (−1, +1) relative to the earnings announcement on day 0. We use the value-weighted CRSP market index as a
proxy for the market return. DISTANCE REST measures the distance of the quarter from restatement announcement. For
example, for the last quarterly earnings announcement of the error period DISTANCE REST= 1, for the quarterly earnings
announcement before last DISTANCE REST= 2, etc. Here, Rt, SUE, and DISTANCE REST are winsorized at 1% and 99%,
standard errors are clustered by industry (3-digit NAICS code). *, **, and *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Restating Firms Plus Control Firms Restating Firms Only
Variable Full Sample Annual Quarterly Annual Full Sample Annual Quarterly
Intercept –0.0001 0.0018 –0.0024 0.0051 –0.0006 0.001 –0.0055
(–0.04) (0.51) (–0.46) (0.96) (–0.14) (0.22) (–0.47)
SUE (
–
b1) 1.0758 1.6206 0.0342 1.6041 0.8942 1.035 –0.2306
(2.84)*** (3.71)*** (0.08) (3.67)*** (2.25)** (3.21)*** (–0.25)
MISTAKE (
–
b2) 1.1691 1.9503 –0.9224 1.3928 0.9498 1.5209 –1.2452
(2.47)** (3.10)*** (–1.32) (2.03)** (1.75)* (3.41)*** (–1.00)
DISTANCE REST (
–
b3) –0.0008
(–0.96)
DISTANCE REST× MISTAKE (–b4) 0.1432
(1.97)*
N 1,106 812 294 812 553 406 147
Adjusted R2 2.01% 4.01% 1.32% 4.08% 1.75% 3.85% 1.42%
F 4.04** 6.90*** 1.54 4.62*** 2.65* 6.62*** 1.28
–
b1 =
–
b2 (t-value) (–0.37) (–0.92) (1.75)* (0.41) (–0.21) (–1.45) (1.59)
Number of restatements 175 93 82 93 175 93 82
Number of ﬁrms 163 89 80 89 163 89 80
apparently treat the misstated component of earnings as being equivalent to the
true component of earnings.
We reestimate equation (2) separately for the annual and quarterly subsam-
ples because annual restatements are deemed to be more serious.21 For the annual
subsample, we again find ¯b1 > 0 and ¯b2 > 0, and the 2 estimates are not dif-
ferent from one another (Model 2 in Table 7). However, the quarterly sample
produces statistically insignificant results (Model 3). The insignificant quarterly
results could be due to the much smaller sample size and different nature of ac-
counting irregularities. Overall, the evidence suggests that investors are misled by
misstated earnings when they are initially announced for our sample of annual
21For both annual and quarterly subsamples, we examine market reaction to the announcement
of quarterly earnings that took place during the error period. Note that for the annual subsample, we
include announcements of quarters (10-Qs) in each restated year. Therefore, we are capturing earnings
surprise for the entire year and not just the 4th quarter.
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restatements. To ensure robustness of our results, we reestimate equation (2) for
restating firms only (Models 5–7). The results are similar for all 3 samples.
We extend equation (2) to test whether investors anticipate accounting mis-
takes. We add an interaction between MISTAKE and a new variable, DISTANCE
REST, which measures the distance of the quarter from the restatement
announcement. For example, for the last quarterly (10-Q) earnings announcement
of the error period, DISTANCE REST = 1, for the announcement of the quar-
terly report before that DISTANCE REST = 2, and so on.22 Equation (2) thus
becomes
Rt = a + b1SUEt + b2MISTAKEt + b3DISTANCE RESTt(3)
+ b4DISTANCE RESTt ×MISTAKEt + εt.
Model 4 in Table 7 shows that the estimate on the interaction ¯b4 is positive
and significant for the sample of restating and control firms, and for restating firms
only, suggesting that investors attach a smaller valuation effect to mistakes made
at the end of the error period compared to mistakes made at the beginning of the
error period. Overall, as the restatement date approaches, investors are less and
less fooled by the errors in reported earnings.
B. Long-Run Valuation of Restating Firms
Our analysis of market reaction to the initial announcement of restatements
reveals that investors are misled by misstated earnings. To examine how long mis-
valuation persists, we analyze CARs and BHARs in the error period. We also ex-
amine CARs and BHARs of restating firms in the pre-error and post-restatement
periods.
Graphs for CARs allow us to show trends in long-run returns and have been
widely used in prior studies (Badertscher et al. (2007)). However, Barber and
Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) document that event studies that
rely on long-term CARs are misspecified, yielding excessive rejection levels.23
Barber and Lyon conclude that a conventional t-statistic applied to BHARs calcu-
lated using size and book-to-market matched control firms yields well-specified
results in random samples. Lyon et al. (1999) also show that the size and book-to-
market matched control firm approach corrects reasonably well for cross-sectional
dependence due to the relation between size, book-to-market ratios, and returns.
Therefore, although we use graphs of long-term CARs to visually depict the trend
in long-run returns, we perform all statistical tests using BHARs.
22A limitation of this approach is that only firms restating many quarters will have observations
with large values of DISTANCE REST. As a result, this variable can partly capture the effect of the
number of periods restated. In the next section we use monthly BHARs to provide more specific
evidence related to when investors start to anticipate a restatement.
23They note 3 main reasons for the misspecification: i) new listing or survivor bias, ii) rebalancing
bias, and iii) skewness bias. New listing bias occurs when the control sample includes firms that begin
trading subsequent to the event. Rebalancing bias arises when returns on the reference portfolio are
calculated assuming periodic rebalancing, while the returns of the event firm are compounded without
rebalancing. Skewness bias occurs when the distribution of long-run abnormal returns is positively
skewed, inducing misspecification of test statistics.
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1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Figure 2 shows CARs around the mistake and the restatement for annual
downward restatements.24 We can select the same fixed-length pre-error and post-
restatement periods for all firms, but the error periods differ across firms. In plot-
ting the abnormal returns over the error period, the longest period one can show
for all firms in the sample is the minimum number of trading days during the error
period, where the minimum is taken over all firms in the sample. As a result, the
graph shows the minimum error period of 267 days for all firms, even though the
error period is firm-specific. An important feature of the graph is that pre-error,
error, and post-restatement periods are nonoverlapping.25
CARs are calculated as the difference between raw returns and market model
predicted returns. Market model parameters are estimated for the period of 250
trading days ending on day −265 relative to the date of the mistake, in order to
allow us to measure abnormal returns over the year prior to the mistake. Efendi,
Srivastava, and Swanson (2007)) find an upward trend in CARs 12 months prior
to the beginning of the error period.26 They suggest that managers could be mo-
tivated to overstate earnings in order to sustain superior performance, consistent
with Jensen’s (2005) theory of overvalued equity.
Figure 2 shows that restating firms have upward trending CARs in the pre-
error period, which continues into the early part of the error period. Control firms
exhibit a downward trend the year before the mistake and bounce around the same
level during the error and post-restatement periods. The positive trend in CARs
and outperformance by restating firms relative to control firms in the 1st half of
the error period are consistent with investors being misled by erroneous account-
ing statements. CARs for restating firms start to decline in the 2nd part of the
error period, suggesting that investors begin to see through the errors. Restating
firms’ CARs subsequently fall below those of the control group, suggesting that
investors penalize restating firms relative to control firms, perhaps because they
anticipate restatement-related costs. Overall, the figure suggests that investors are
misled during the beginning of the error period but catch on and partially antic-
ipate the restatement announcement later in the period. Finally, looking at the
post-restatement period, Figure 2 shows a slightly negative trend in CARs of
restating firms compared to the control firms.
2. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns
Next we examine BHARs for pre-error, error, and post-restatement periods.
The error period gets most of our attention. Following Spiess and Affleck-Graves
(1999) and others, we calculate a buy-and-hold return (BHRi,τ ) over period τ for
firm i as the geometric return
24Since all of our statistical inference is drawn from BHARs, we show only one graph using CARs
for our main sample to allow for the comparison to prior studies.
25Please see legend to Figure 2 for details of graph construction.
26Efendi et al. (2007) examine CARs of 95 firms restating earnings between January 1, 2001 and
June 30, 2002.
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FIGURE 2
CARs for Annual Downward Restatements
Figure 2 plots cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 196 downward annual restatements with available data announced
between January 1, 1997 and June 30, 2002, and their control ﬁrms. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference
between actual returns and market model predicted returns. Market model parameters are estimated for the period of
250 trading days ending on day –265 relative to the date of the mistake using a value-weighted CRSP index. Annual
restatements are restatements that include a revision of at least 1 annual (audited) report. Quarterly restatements are
deﬁned as restatements of quarterly ﬁnancial statements only and no restatement of an annual (audited) report. Downward
(upward) restatements are deﬁned as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. The numbers
in regular font on the horizontal axis show days relative to the mistake. The numbers in italics show days relative to the
restatement announcement. MISTAKE marks the beginning of the year of the 1st mistake. RESTATEMENT marks the day
of the restatement announcement. We identify all speciﬁc dates relative to key events, where Den is day n relative to event
e. A negative value of n indicates days before the event, while a positive n indicates days after the event. For example, the
superscript MISTAKE indicates that the date is speciﬁed relative to the day of the mistake, with the day of the mistake being
day 0. Superscript RESTATEMENT indicates that days are numbered relative to the day of the restatement, with the day
of the restatement being day 0. Thus, the symbol, D MISTAKE−b refers to the trading day b days before the mistake occurs,
and D RESTATEMENTa indicates the trading day that falls a days after the restatement announcement. H is the midpoint of
the minimum error period. Given these deﬁnitions, we plot CARs for 3 periods:
1) the pre-error period (D MISTAKE−250 , D
MISTAKE
0 ),
2) the error period, including 3 subperiods:
a) early error period (DMISTAKE1 , D
MISTAKE
H ),
b) midpoint [DMISTAKEH+1 , D
RESTATEMENT
−H−1 ],
c) late error period (D RESTATEMENT−H , D
RESTATEMENT
−1 ), and
3) the post-restatement period (D RESTATEMENT0 , D
RESTATEMENT
+250 ).
For the subsample of downward annual restatements, the minimum error period covers 267 trading days, and hence
H = 133, D MISTAKEH = 133, D
MISTAKE
H+1 = 134, and D
RESTATEMENT
−H−1 = −134. The CARs are calculated around mis-
takes for the period (−250, 133) and around restatements for the period (−133, 250). Abnormal returns in the period
(DMISTAKE134 , D
RESTATEMENT
−134 ) are averaged into a 1-day return and are plotted as a single day’s abnormal return. For a
ﬁrm with the minimum error period of 267 days, this is a 1-day window. For other ﬁrms, this period varies in length. As a
result, the graph shows the minimum error period of length 267 for all ﬁrms, even though the error period is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
Control ﬁrms are matched by size and book-to-market within the same 3-digit NAICS code. We compute size as the market
value of equity: price per share times the number of shares outstanding. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of
book value in period m− 1 divided by the market value of common equity in period m− 1. Here, m is the year of the ﬁrm’s
mistake (if the ﬁrm is restating several years, we calculate the ratio for the year before the 1st restating year). For example, if
the company restates 1996 ﬁnancial statements, we ﬁnd the matching ﬁrm according to the size and book-to-market ratios
as of 1995. We eliminate all restating ﬁrms from the pool of potential control ﬁrms. We also require a control ﬁrm to have
CRSP returns for as many days as its restating ﬁrm 1 year prior to the mistake and 1 year subsequent to the restatement.
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BHRi,τ =
T∏
t
(1 + Rit),(4)
where Rit is the ith firm return on the tth day, and T is the number of trading days
in period τ . Here, BHRi,τ represents the actual experience of an investor who
passively holds a sample firm for the period τ .
Then BHARi,τ is calculated as
BHARi,τ = BHRi,τ − E(BHRi,τ ),(5)
where E(BHRi,τ ) is the τ period expected return for security i, proxied by the
return on a size and book-to-market matched peer firm in the same industry
(3-digit NAICS code) as the restating firm.27
First, to allow for direct comparison of results using CARs and BHARs,
we show graphs of monthly BHARs for the following periods: i) 1 year before
the mistake, ii) the minimum error period (which varies across samples), and
iii) 1 year after restatement (Figure 3). We assume that the announcement effect
covers days (−1,+5) relative to restatement, so that pre-restatement BHARs end
on day −2, and post-restatement BHARs start on day +6. Each month is assumed
to have 21 trading days. Only survivors are included in the calculation of each
month’s BHARs. Solid bars show BHARs that are significant at 10% or better,
and hollow bars show insignificant BHARs. We test whether BHARs differ statis-
tically from 0 using a t-test. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) show
that the control firm approach used in this study eliminates new listing, rebalanc-
ing, and skewness biases, and yields well-specified t-tests.
Graph A of Figure 3 shows BHARs for annual downward restatements (same
sample as that shown in Figure 2). It shows that these restating firms do not ex-
perience any abnormal performance prior to a mistake, other than during 1 month
immediately preceding the start of the error period, during which they have a pos-
itive BHAR of 2.8% ( p-value = 9%). BHARs during the 1st part of the error
period vary in sign and are not significantly different from 0, but become negative
in the 2nd part of the error period and are negative and significant at 1% or better
in the last 3 months before restatement announcement. The magnitude of the neg-
ative returns prior to restatement is large: BHARs equal −6.2%, −5.3%, −5.1%
during months −3, −2, and −1 before restatement, respectively. This result sug-
gests that investors anticipate annual downward restatements.
BHAR for the period starting 3 months before the announcement of
restatement and ending on day +5 after restatement announcement equals−28.0%
(−29.1% for survivors only), which is almost 3 times the average 3-day restate-
ment announcement return. Examination of returns post restatement reveals that
restating firms exhibit particularly negative performance in months 5 and 6 after
restatement. BHARs for months +5 and +6 equal−4.61% and−4.53% ( p-values
of 2% and 4%), respectively.
Graph B of Figure 3 examines BHARs for annual downward restatements
of 2 years or more. For these firms we are able to show a longer error period.
27The 3-digit NAICS code is comparable to the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code (Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003)).
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Overall results are similar for this subset of firms and the full sample of annual
downward restatements, especially in pre-error and post-restatement periods. We
also observe negative returns before restatement. BHARs are negative and sig-
nificant only during the month before restatement, and they stay negative and
significant 1 month after the restatement. The BHAR in month −1 equals −7.9%
( p-value = 1%), while the BHAR in month +1 equals −6.9% ( p-value = 6%).
For this sample where the erroneous financial reports persist for more than 2 an-
nual reports, investors appear to start anticipating downward restatements some-
what later, and they take longer to fully impound the information contained in re-
statement announcements. This result suggests that mistakes that persist for more
than 2 years are different and perhaps more difficult for investors to digest.
Graphs C and D of Figure 3 show results for quarterly downward restate-
ments and quarterly downward restatements of 2 quarters or more, respectively.
FIGURE 3
Monthly BHARs
Graphs A–E of Figure 3 plot monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for 220 annual downward restatements, 104
annual downward restatements of 2 years or more, 143 quarterly downward restatements, 79 quarterly downward restate-
ments of 2 quarters or more, and 35 annual upward restatements announced between January 1, 1997 and June 30, 2002
and control ﬁrms, respectively. Annual restatements are restatements that include a revision of at least 1 annual (audited)
report. Quarterly restatements are deﬁned as restatements of quarterly ﬁnancial statements only and no restatement of an
annual (audited) report. Downward (upward) restatements are deﬁned as restatements that result in downward (upward)
revision of net income. Solid bars show BHARs that are signiﬁcant at 10% or better, and hollow bars show insigniﬁcant
BHARs. We test whether BHARs differ statistically from 0 using a t-test. The numbers in regular font on the horizontal axis
show days relative to the mistake. The numbers in italics show days relative to the restatement announcement. MISTAKE
marks the beginning of the year of the 1st mistake. RESTATEMENT marks the day of the restatement announcement. Only
survivors are included in the calculation of each month’s BHARs. Calculations before restatement start on day −2, and
calculations after restatement start on day +6. Each month is assumed to have 21 trading days. Control ﬁrms are matched
by size and book-to-market within the same 3-digit NAICS code. We compute size as the market value of equity: price per
share times the number of shares outstanding. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value in period m−1
divided by the market value of common equity in period m − 1. Here, m is the year of the ﬁrm’s mistake. We eliminate
all restating ﬁrms from the pool of potential control ﬁrms. We also require a control ﬁrm to have CRSP returns for as many
days as its restating ﬁrm 1 year prior to the mistake and 1 year subsequent to the restatement.
Graph A. Monthly BHARs for Annual Downward Restatements
(continued on next page)
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When a firm is restating only 1 quarter, the error period is very short, and there is
little time for the market to revise its expectations about the accuracy of the firm’s
financial data based on comparisons with other firms. Therefore, we focus most
of our discussion on the results for restatements of 2 quarters or more (Graph D
of Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 (continued)
Monthly BHARs
Graph B. Monthly BHARs for Annual Downward Restatements of 2 Years or More
Graph C. Monthly BHARs for Quarterly Downward Restatements
(continued on next page)
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FIGURE 3 (continued)
Monthly BHARs
Graph D. Monthly BHARs for Quarterly Downward Restatements of 2 Quarters or More
Graph E. Monthly BHARs for Annual Upward Restatements
For both samples, we find no abnormal returns prior to mistake and during
the 1st part of the error period. BHARs are negative and significant 1 month before
restatement in Graph C of Figure 3 and 2 months before restatement in Graph D,
and are negative and significant 2 months after restatement in both figures. In
Graph D, BHARs in months −2 and −1 relative to restatement equal −8.3% and
−10.4% with p-values of 2% and 1%, respectively. For this sample, BHARs in
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months −3 and −5 relative to restatement are also significant and equal −9.8%
in each of those months with p-values of 1% and 4%, respectively.28 We also find
negative returns in month +4 after restatements in both figures. This result sug-
gests early anticipation of quarterly downward restatements and slow reaction to
their announcement. Overall, firms that make quarterly downward restatements
lose 33.5% over 4 months (months −2, −1, +1, and +2) surrounding the restate-
ment, which is more than 3 times the average restatement announcement affect
documented in earlier studies.29
Lastly, Graph E of Figure 3 shows monthly BHARs for annual upward
restatements. We observe both positive and negative BHARs in the pre-error
period: a negative BHAR equal to−11.5% in month−10 ( p-value= 1%), a pos-
itive BHAR equal to 13.3% in month −9 ( p-value = 1%), and a positive BHAR
equal to 7.6% in month−1 ( p-value= 4%). These firms also experience negative
BHARs of −10.6% ( p-value = 4%) 1 month prior to restatement announcement.
Month +10 relative to restatement has a −11.1% BHAR ( p-value = 10%). We
do not place much weight on these results, because there are only 35 upward re-
statements. Moreover, as shown in the analysis that follows (Table 8), long-run
BHARs are insignificant for full pre-error, error, and post-restatement periods for
annual upward restatements. Nevertheless, combined with the forthcoming results
from Table 8, we can say that upward restatements are not good news, perhaps
because they reveal management and internal control system failures.
Table 8 presents further analysis of BHARs in the pre-error, error, and post-
restatement periods. The difference between results shown in Figure 3 and Table 8
is that Table 8 splits the error period into quartiles and estimates daily BHARs
for each quartile. The length of a quartile is firm-specific, and is calculated by
dividing a firm’s error period trading days by 4. We also examine the patterns of
BHARs 3 years before mistake and 3 years after restatement, as well as around
the announcement of the restatement for windows (−1,+1) and (−1,+5). BHARs
in the last quartile of the error period are calculated for the period ending 1 day
before the restatement announcement. BHARs in the post-restatement period are
calculated starting 5 days after the restatement announcement. We assume that
there are 250 trading days in 1 year.
Daily BHARs are found as follows:
BHARPERIODl =
N∑
i=1
((
BHARPERIODRESTATING,i,l − BHARPERIODCONTROL,i,l
)
/Li
)
/N,(6)
where BHARPERIODl is the daily BHAR for 1 of the 3 periods (pre-error, error,
or post-restatement) of length l, BHARPERIODRESTATING,i,l (BHARPERIODCONTROL,i,l) is the buy-
and-hold return for restating (control) firm i for period l, Li is the number of trading
days in the period for firm i, and N is the number of firms. To avoid survivorship
28This result is not shown. Recall that Graph D in Figure 3 shows the error period of the minimum
length, and BHARs for each month are calculated for survivors for their respective month only. There-
fore, all months shown in figures are nonoverlapping. However, month−3 relative to restatement will
overlap with month +2 relative to mistake for firms with the minimum error period.
29The BHAR for this window for survivors only equals 30.1%.
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TABLE 8
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns in Pre-Error, Error, and Post-Restatement Periods
Daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are computed as the difference between buy-and-hold returns of restating ﬁrms and control ﬁrms in the same 3-digit NAICS code matched by size and book-to-market
in the year before the 1st mistake. We split the error period into quartiles and estimate daily BHARs for each quartile. Each quartile represents 1 quarter of the entire error period for the speciﬁed restating ﬁrm. Thus,
the length of a quartile is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and is calculated by dividing the number of trading days in the error period by 4. We also examine the patterns of BHAR 3 years before mistake and 3 years after restatement,
as well as around the restatement announcement windows (−1, +1) and (−1, +5). BHARs in the last quartile of the error period are calculated for the period ending 1 day before restatement announcement.
BHARs in the post-restatement period are calculated starting 5 days after the restatement announcement. We assume that there are 250 trading days in 1 year. Daily BHARs are found as follows:
(6) BHAR PERIODl =
N∑
i=1
((
BHAR PERIODRESTATING,i,l − BHAR PERIODCONTROL,i,l
)
/Li
)
/N,
where BHAR PERIODl is the daily BHAR for 1 of the 3 periods (pre-error, error, or post-restatement) of length l, BHAR
PERIOD
RESTATING,i,l (BHAR
PERIOD
CONTROL,i,l) is the buy-and-hold return for restating (control) ﬁrm i for period
l, Li is the number of trading days in the period for ﬁrm i, and N is the number of ﬁrms. Annual restatements are deﬁned as restatements that include a revision of at least 1 annual report. Quarterly restatements are
deﬁned as restatements of less than 4 quarters and no restatement of an annual report. Downward (upward) restatements are deﬁned as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. Core
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if revenue or expense accounts were restated. Fraud is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company announced fraud as a reason for restatement. The signiﬁcance of BHARs
is tested with t-tests. The signiﬁcance of BHAR differences between subsamples are tested with Wilcoxon nonparametric tests. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Year Relative to Mistake Quartiles of the Error Period Restatement Announcement Year Relative to Restatement
−3 −2 −1 1 2 3 4 Error Period Daily (−1, +1) (−1, +1) Daily (−1, +5) (−1, +5) 1 2 3
Panel A. Daily Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns for Annual Downward Restatements
Mean −0.004% 0.022% 0.002% 0.031% 0.018% −0.053% −0.237% −0.079% −3.943% −11.192% −1.900% −10.386% −0.328% −0.317% −0.307%
N 218 217 217 218 219 219 220 220 214 214 214 214 204 204 204
p-value 0.91 0.51 0.94 0.46 0.53 0.12 <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
Panel B. Daily Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns for Quarterly Downward Restatements
Mean 0.045% 0.055% 0.044% −0.096% −0.300% −0.261% −0.539% −0.308% −3.326% −9.839% −1.416% −9.387% −0.262% −0.204% −0.204%
N 143 143 143 142 142 142 142 142 143 143 143 143 141 141 141
p-value 0.39 0.29 0.39 0.19 <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 0.07* 0.15 0.15
Panel C. Daily Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns for Annual Upward Restatements
Mean −0.045% −0.029% −0.025% 0.118% 0.053% –0.126% 0.015% 0.425% −2.620% −7.860% −1.068% −7.478% −0.501% 0.000% −0.028%
N 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
p-value 0.44 0.62 0.71 0.13 0.54 0.65 0.92 0.28 <0.01*** <0.01*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.20 1.00 0.73
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 8 (continued)
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns in Pre-Error, Error, and Post-Restatement Periods
Panel D. Core vs. Noncore – Annual Downward Restatements
Core Noncore
Quartiles of the Error Period Quartiles of the Error Period
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Mean 0.08% –0.01% –0.07% –0.34% –0.02% 0.04% –0.04% –0.14%
N 103 104 104 105 115 115 115 115
p-value 0.24 0.90 0.21 <0.01*** 0.74 0.31 0.37 0.01***
Difference between Core and Noncore 0.10% –0.04% –0.03% –0.20%
Wilcoxon Pr> Z 0.59 0.14 0.85 0.05**
Panel E. Core vs. Noncore – Quarterly Downward Restatements
Core Noncore
Quartiles of the Error Period Quartiles of the Error Period
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Mean –0.02% –0.31% –0.31% –0.77% –0.19% –0.29% –0.20% –0.27%
N 77 77 77 77 65 65 65 65
p-value 0.88 0.02** 0.01*** <0.01*** 0.03** 0.02** 0.04** 0.01***
Difference between Core and Noncore 0.17% –0.01% –0.10% –0.51%
Wilcoxon Pr> Z 0.12 0.76 0.78 0.01***
Panel F. Fraud vs. Nonfraud – Annual Downward Restatements
Fraud Nonfraud
Quartiles of the Error Period Quartiles of the Error Period
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Mean 0.15% 0.07% –0.12% –0.12% 0.00% 0.01% –0.04% –0.27%
N 43 43 43 43 175 176 176 177
p-value 0.23 0.45 0.04** 0.01*** 1.00 0.82 0.35 <0.01***
Difference between Fraud and Nonfraud 0.15% 0.06% –0.08% 0.14%
Wilcoxon Pr> Z 0.10* 0.63 0.22 0.67
bias, we report results for a sample with firms that have any returns in the period
studied, rather than a sample that had returns for the entire period (survivors).
Panel A of Table 8 shows that firms making annual downward restatements
have 0 BHARs before their mistakes. BHARs in the error period are positive but
insignificant in the 1st and 2nd quartiles, but become negative in the 3rd quar-
tile, and negative and significant in the 4th quartile. BHARs decrease from quar-
tile to quartile as the restatement announcement approaches. Overall results are
consistent with investors being initially fooled by erroneous financial reports but
nevertheless anticipating restatements.
Confirming results of prior studies, we find negative and significant returns
at the announcement of the restatement. The BHAR for the window (−1,+1) is
−11.19%. We also find that restating firms underperform up to 3 years after a
restatement. However, this result does not hold for any of the post-restatement
periods when we examine only survivors, suggesting that poorer performers stop
trading.30 All other results in this panel are robust when the sample is limited to
survivors only.
30When we analyze survivors only, the sample drops to 133, 110, and 92 observations for years +1,
+2, and +3 relative to restatement, respectively.
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The BHAR results for quarterly downward restatements are similar to those
of annual downward restatements (Panel B of Table 8). However, quarterly
downward restating firms start experiencing negative performance in the error
period much sooner, in the 2nd quartile of the error period. When we analyze
survivors only, positive BHARs 2 years before restatement and negative BHARs
3 years after restatement become significant. The rest of the results are unchanged.
Panel C of Table 8 shows that firms making annual upward restatements do
not exhibit statistically significant abnormal performance in any of the periods,
except for a −7.86% announcement effect.31 If investors had mistakenly used
understated earnings to project future earnings, one might expect a positive an-
nouncement effect. Negative reaction to the restatement of net income upward
suggests that restatements, up or down, increase expected costs to all restating
firms in terms of reputation, operating expenses, and expected legal expenses.32
Overall, the analysis in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 8 suggests that investors antici-
pate downward restatements.
C. Further Analysis: Core and Fraud Restatements
We also examine whether investors rely more on core accounts. Previous lit-
erature found that markets react more strongly to surprises in ongoing operating
income than to one-time special items (Elliott and Hanna (1996)). If this is true
and investors are misled, misstatement of core accounts (revenue and expense ac-
counts) should result in greater misvaluation and abnormal returns. Alternatively,
investors may pay closer attention to core accounts and start seeing mistakes in
such accounts sooner. Arguably, intentional fraudulent misstatements of financial
results are more difficult for investors to see through than random mistakes and
make it more difficult for investors to estimate true earnings. Hence, restatements
due to fraud could cause greater misvaluation.33 We rely on the firm’s restatement
announcement to identify cases where fraud was involved.
Specifically, we test whether valuation in the error period is different for
restatements of core versus noncore accounts and fraudulent restatements for an-
nual and quarterly downward restatements. Due to small sample size, we do not
perform this analysis for annual upward restatements.34
31Results are not affected by restricting the sample to survivors only.
32To check the robustness of the results, we calculated BHARs for fixed-length windows relative
to mistake and restatement. Specifically, we calculated BHARs for 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, and 24 months
relative to mistake and restatement for annual restatements, and for 3, 6, 9, and 12 months for quarterly
restatements. The results are consistent with those found using firm-specific quartiles of the error
period (Table 7) and using monthly BHARs (Figure 3), so we do not report them here.
33Prior studies find that the pressure to sustain positive earnings growth, inflation of CEO com-
pensation, and issuance of equity and debt at favorable prices can motivate managers to intentionally
misreport (Richardson et al. (2003), Efendi et al. (2007), and Burns and Kedia (2007)). Offsetting
these motivations is the fact that restatement of financial reports is a negative event for the manage-
ment of the firm: Management loses credibility with shareholders, customers, and employees and is
often forced to resign (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006)).
34We also reestimated equation (2) and interact MISTAKE with CORE and FRAUD dummy vari-
ables, where CORE equals 1 if revenue or expense accounts were restated and FRAUD equals 1 if the
company announced fraud as a reason for restatement (the results are not shown). The coefficient
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Panel D of Table 8 presents error period BHARs for subsamples of restate-
ments of core and noncore accounts for annual downward restatements. We find
that the 4th quartile BHARs are much lower for the core subsample.35 This result
could be due to the fact that investors pay more attention to core accounts and
penalize firms misstating core accounts more, or start to notice those mistakes
sooner. Panel E of Table 8 compares error period BHARs for the sample of quar-
terly downward restatements and finds similar evidence. Panel F of Table 8 exam-
ines error period BHARs for fraud and nonfraud subsamples and shows that 1st
quartile BHARs are positive for the fraud subsample and are significantly higher
than those for the nonfraud subsample. It appears that fraudulent mistakes mislead
the market more in the 1st quartile of the error period. We do not analyze fraud and
nonfraud subsamples for quarterly downward restatements because they contain
only 6 fraudulent restatements.
V. Conclusion
This paper tests whether investors see through mistakes in reported earnings
by examining market reaction to initially reported erroneous earnings and valua-
tion of restating firms during the error period, before earnings are corrected. We
also examine the long-run return performance of restating companies in 3 periods:
i) the period prior to the mistake (pre-error period); ii) the period after the mistake
has been made but before the restatement (error period); and iii) the period after
the restatement (post-restatement period). We focus on the error period, which we
split into 4 quartiles.
Results show that investors are initially misled by mistakes in financial state-
ments. At the initial announcement of erroneous earnings, investors treat the
error component of earnings the same as the true component. However, valuation
of the error component decreases as the restatement date approaches, suggesting
that investors start to catch on sometime before a restatement occurs. Valuation
(CAR and BHAR) trends measured during the error period also show that in-
vestors anticipate restatements. We find that restating firms that overstate net in-
come underperform the market and matched control firms several months before
their restatement announcements.
Overall, our evidence suggests that investors are initially misled by misstated
earnings but start seeing through mistakes as the restatement date approaches.
When anticipation of a restatement is taken into account, the effect of the restate-
ment is more than 3 times its announcement effect. Our results support the view
that better quality of financial information could benefit investors.
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